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The organism – 
reality or fiction?
CHARLES T WOLFE SCOUTS THE ANSWERS
W
hat is an “organism”? A state 
of matter, or a particular type 
of living being chosen as an 
experimental object, like the 
fruit fly or the roundworm c. elegans, which 
are “model organisms”? Organisms are real, in 
a trivial sense, since flies and Tasmanian tigers 
and Portuguese men-o-war are (or were, in the 
case of the Tasmanian tiger) as real as tables and 
chairs and planets. But at the same time, they 
are meaningful constructs, as when we describe 
Hegel or Whitehead as philosophers of organism 
in the sense that they insist on the irreducible 
properties of wholes – sometimes, living wholes 
in particular. In addition, the idea of organism 
is sometimes appealed to in a polemical way, as 
when biologists or philosophers angrily oppose a 
more “holistic” sense of organism to a seemingly 
cold-hearted, analytic and dissective attitude 
associated with “mechanism” and “reductionism”. 
We murder to dissect, or as the famous physicist 
Niels Bohr warned, we may kill the organism 
with our too-detailed measurements.
Historically, the word “organism” emerged in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centu-
ries, in particular, in the debate between the 
philosopher and polymath Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz and the chemist and physician Georg-
Ernest Stahl, the author of a 1708 essay On the 
difference between mechanism and organism. 
Both Leibniz and Stahl agree that organisms 
are not the same as mere mechanisms, but 
they differ on how to account for this differ-
ence. For Leibniz, it is more of a difference in 
complexity (for him, organisms are machines 
which are machines down to their smallest parts), 
whereas for Stahl, the organism is a type of whole 
governed by the soul (at all levels of our bodily 
functioning, from the way I blink if an object 
comes too close to my eyes, to “my” fighting off 
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an infection, to fully involuntary proc-
esses like digestion). After this one doesn’t 
find the term much used in our sense until the 
late eighteenth century. It occurs rarely in the 
Enlightenment (people spoke more of “organ-
ised bodies” or “organisation”); thus Kant’s 
insistence, in his third Critique, on the unique 
kind of purposive arrangement found in organ-
isms, uses the language of “organised bodies”.
A curious feature about the notion of organism 
is that it is located from the outset at the inter-
section of philosophical inquiry into the nature 
of living beings (Leibniz, Kant like Aristotle 
before them) and properly biological reflec-
tion. For this is also the period when biology as 
a science is emerging. Some of the motivation 
was a reaction to the popularity of the notion 
of machine. The mechanical philosophy of the 
seventeenth century – Boyle, Hobbes, Descartes 
but also attempts in medicine to study bodies 
and body parts as if they were 
mechanical – rested on the notion 
that natural phenomena result from interactions 
between material particles governed by the laws 
of mechanics. This enabled the formulation of 
laws of motion and the invention of particular 
mechanisms, the latter allowing one to explain 
particular phenomena. One thinks of the popu-
larity of clockwork metaphors, but also of actual 
automata, designed to replicate the functioning 
of animals (as in the case of Vaucanson’s duck).
Aside from the classic philosophers 
mentioned above, philosophers in the twentieth 
century have had a certain interest in the concept 
of organism. Originally, the interest came espe-
cially from phenomenologically motivated 
authors such as Kurt Goldstein, Hans Jonas, and 
on the other side of the Rhine, Henri Bergson 
and Gilbert Simondon. (Whitehead is hard to 
fit in a neat conceptual box here.). In biology, 
Mechanical duck 
(via Wikimedia Commons)
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for a long time with the rise of genetics and 
popular concepts such as the “selfish gene”, the 
organism was viewed as consigned to the dustbin 
of history. Any privileged status granted to irre-
ducible wholes will disappear – on this view – in 
favour of the molecularisation of biological enti-
ties. Thus the journal American Zoologist asked 
in 1989, “Do organisms exist?”, and described 
the organism as the “Phoenix” of biology. As the 
distinguished philosopher of biology David Hull 
put it, “both scientists and philosophers take 
ontological reduction for granted …. Organisms 
are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and that is that.” Yet the 
story does not end there. Biologists interested 
in evolution, but also developmental processes, 
ecosystems, and problem cases such as coral reefs 
or symbiotic organisms, have begun to ask ques-
tions again concerning the nature of biological 
identity and individuality, which as a side effect 
brings back in a role for philosophy. Perhaps it is 
a false or empty promise to insist that the world 
is made up of atoms or genes and replicators, and 
nothing else; perhaps we should speak, with the 
biologists Queller and Strassman, of “degrees of 
organismality”.
The degree of reality of the concept of 
organism, then, is bound up with a variety of 
other issues. One is the status of biology and 
biological entities with regard to physics: how do 
we decide what gets to be “the most real” sorts of 
entities? Another is the role for philosophy. For 
there is a kind of symbiotic – or is it parasitical? – 
relationship between the metaphysician looking 
to examples from the biological world to support 
her claims about identity, and the biologist 
appealing to metaphysical notions to differen-
tiate the “systems” she studies from atoms, or 
machines, or numbers. Thirdly, the more ideo-
logical implications of the organism concept tie 
it directly to what sort of position we take on 
the relation between humanity and scientific 
explanations.
Let’s distinguish between strong and weak 
conceptions of organism, where the weak 
conception simply holds that organisms are 
types of organisation with some specific features, 
like homeostasis, which are not found in storms 
or supernovas, whereas the strong concep-
tion insists on a real, irreducible uniqueness of 
organisms and challenges our entire scientific 
world-picture on the basis thereof. Thus the 
defender of the “strong concept” of organism, 
not content to assert like Heidegger that “science 
does not think” and end it there, will try and shift 
the conflict into the territory of science, and will 
say that there should be a science of the organism 
itself, a holistic science, a “new paradigm”, which 
would overcome or refute the excessively reduc-
tionist paradigm we have been saddled with since 
the Scientific Revolution.
The problem with all of this, whether or not 
one accepts the verdict of “mainstream science” 
that the organism in itself either does not exist 
or does not matter, is that this kind of defence 
or challenge has something very normative about 
it. It is in the name of a certain idea of value that 
With the rise of genetics the organism 
was consigned to the dustbin of history
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primates and humans all live in, interact with, 
and customise their environments which we can 
describe as meaningful (think e.g. of the bower 
bird): they are worlds.
Rather than arguing over what is most real – 
atoms and protons, or hearts and lungs – it could 
be interesting to take account of the way in which 
organisms relate to the meaningful traits of their 
environment (this is partly discussed by biologists 
as “niche construction”), since it is also our own 
doing.
Rather than asserting that “organisms are 
special because of their special relation between 
whole and parts” (as in Aristotle’s arresting image 
that a hand severed from the body is no longer 
a hand), or more empirically, “organisms are 
special because they digest, sweat, fear, love, 
have high blood pressure or low blood sugar” 
(a claim partly weakened by artificial construc-
tions from Vaucanson’s duck to Wim Delvoye’s 
“Cloaca”), we would be better off acknowledging 
that there is always an imaginative, and even a 
fictional component in our attempts to make 
sense of organisms. Even the most die-hard 
mechanists make use of analogies and models to 
understand that most complex of machines, the 
living body. A mechanical model is nothing else 
than a heuristic model designed to explain some-
thing about the object which “strong organicists” 
seek a monopoly on, Life.
When Kant (in)famously declared that there 
will never be a Newton of even a mere blade of 
grass – that is, that science, which he understood 
one defends a particularity of living beings; think 
of the expression “pro-life”! To those who insist 
that there is something about life, the fact of life, 
and the unique features of living beings which 
almost prior to argument is a value, I would reply 
with Nietzsche’s comment that “Life is not an 
argument. Among the conditions of life might 
be error,” a comment which harks back to old 
Epicurean themes (the world is composed of 
atoms and chance) but which can also be heard 
in Darwinian terms: the fact that one species 
rather than other survived has a dimension of 
“accident” to it.
I suggest that a useful concept of organism, if 
we are to have one – a concept of organism worth 
wanting, in Daniel Dennett’s phrase – will have 
to be compatible with a broad commitment to 
philosophical naturalism. That is, it will not seek 
to oppose organisms to the rest of physical nature, 
neither in terms of their possessing a mysterious 
inner life which other beings do not possess, nor 
because they possess a mysterious “vital force”. 
In some sense, as the great eighteenth-century 
French naturalist Buffon wrote, “the organic is 
the most ordinary product of nature.” Of course, 
if we push that notion of ordinariness too far, 
we lose sight of an interesting feature of organ-
isms, including ourselves: that they live in their 
own environments. Lizards, finches, tarantulas, 
How do we decide 
what gets to be 
“the most real”?
The word “organism” 
emerged in a debate 
between Leibniz and 
the chemist Georg-
Ernest Stahl
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as mathematically specifiable mechanistic 
science, could never account for or “discover” the 
laws governing organic beings – or when Leibniz 
insisted that the difference between a “machine 
of nature” (his term for an organism) and an 
artificial machine is that a machine of nature, 
a living being, is a machine to infinity, they are 
both clinging to the idea of a certain special 
“something”, whether that be “wonder tissue” or 
“selfhood”, which constructions and reconstruc-
tions cannot grasp.
In contrast, we should recall that an impor-
tant dimension of mechanical models is their 
heuristic dimension: mechanisms are also “built 
so as to see what is inside them”. If organisms 
are particular, complex cases of mechanisms, this 
does not amount to the rather knee-jerk reduc-
tionist insistence that “Life” does not exist, or 
that there are only atoms or genes.
Let me put this point differently, and draw out 
some of its implications. First, organisms are not 
free from our acts of imaginative construction. 
Second, there is no absolute separation between 
organisms and mechanisms, or organisms and the 
physical world as a whole. Third, if our desire 
to preserve the uniqueness of flesh-and-blood, 
living, breathing, suffering and/or joyous entities 
over and against an imagined cold, dead, inert 
Necropolis takes the form of a list of irreducible 
empirical features, we are not on the right track. 
For one thing, we do not have any absolute, 
empirical or conceptual criterion with which we 
could distinguish a living being from a non-living 
being, whether the integrity of the organism, its 
self-regulation (homeostasis), or “metabolism”. 
These features are always post facto observations, 
starting from within a temporal process. In that 
sense, the relation between living and non-living, 
organism and machine, is an empirical relation, 
which does not allow one to posit qualitative 
differences between laws of nature. As the theo-
retical biologist Robert Rosen says, “there is as 
yet no list of tests, characteristics or criteria we 
can apply to a given material system that can 
decide whether that system is an organism or 
not”; “the decision as to whether a given system 
is an organism is entirely a subjective, intuitive 
one, based on criteria that have so far resisted 
formalization.”
Any strong claims about the reality of organ-
isms will be based on (a) heuristic fiction(s)! The 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, oils on wood by Johann Friedrich 
Wentzel c1700 (via Wikimedia Commons)
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The other question I have discussed, 
concerning, not the individuality of organisms 
but their reality – what is different, or special 
about them as compared to machines, or physical 
Nature as a whole, including as it pertains to the 
old “what is Life?” question (where the differ-
ence is more, “a living body versus a corpse”) 
– has faded away, in comparison with that of indi-
viduality. But if such a question were asked, we 
might say that the organism is nothing other than 
the production of a vital artificiality or fiction; and 
it is never alone: an organism can only be a “para-
digmatic individual” in and through its relation 
to a population, a group or an environment as a 
whole. If there is nothing unique about organ-
isms over and against the rest of Nature; if, as 
Buffon thought, “the organic is the most ordinary 
product of nature,” what does exist is a certain 
approach to reality, a fiction, the way a partic-
ular bundle of living matter exists, feels joy and 
regret, remembers, ages and thereby briefly satu-
rates a particular intersection in the great causal 
nexus of the world.
Charles T Wolfe is a research fellow in philosophy 
at Ghent University, in Belgium
latter phrase is meant to convey, also, that organ-
isms are a cognitive construct of our minds: in 
order to be able to understand an entity we need 
to project certain features onto it; but these 
features should not be held to be constitutive of 
certain “regions” of the real. Those of us who are 
fond of Darwinian flourishes would add that it 
may be a survival trait to be able to “read” certain 
organisms as organisms rather than as bundles 
of molecules. Thus, in an evocative example 
suggested by Dennett, if I am being pursued by 
a tiger in a jungle, it is a better idea for me to view 
that tiger as an organism – as a total, intercon-
nected system of parts with unified functions and 
goals, including “eating me” – rather than as a set 
of atoms or molecules which I try to calculate the 
laws of: if I view it in the latter way, the chances 
of my making it out alive are much reduced. 
Thus, seeing the world, or at least parts of the 
world, from an organismic standpoint would be 
a competitive advantage.
The category of “organism” has returned, if 
not to centre stage then at least to the horizon 
of the active interests of biologists – whether 
they are concerned with evolution, ecosystems, 
systems biology, physiology, developmental proc-
esses and the like – and philosophers concerned 
either with what the life sciences tell us about 
some of our fundamental preoccupations, and/
or with classic metaphysical problems like indi-
viduality and personal identity. In what sense 
am I “one” with the bacteria in my gut? In what 
sense is a coral reef one organism, or colony 
individuals like the Portuguese man-o-war, or 
symbiotic cases like the squid which ingests 
phosphorescent bacteria so that it can hunt at 
night, rendered invisible by the luminescence 
on its back? 
Organisms are 
not free from our 
acts of imaginative 
construction
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